The Theory of Moral Sentiments Guide, Meaning , Facts, Information and Description
The Theory of Moral Sentiments written by Adam Smith in 1759, is one of the most important works in the theory of capitalism. It provides the ethical, philosophical, psychological and methodological underpinnings to Smith's later works including The Wealth of Nations (1776), A Treatise on Public Opulence (1764) (first published in 1937), Essays on Philosophical Subjects (1795), and Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms (1763) (first published in 1896).Broadly speaking, Smith followed his mentor, Francis Hutcheson's (University of Glasgow), division of moral philosophy into four parts: Ethics and Virtue; Private rights and Natural liberty; Familial rights (called Oeconomicks); and State and Individual rights (called Politicks).
More specificly he divided moral systems into:
- Categories of the nature of morality
- These include Propriety, Prudence, Benevolence, and Licentiousness.
- Categories of the motive of morality
- These include Self-love, Reason, and Sentiment.
Smith rejected his teachers reliance on this special sense. Starting in about 1741 Smith set on the task of using Hume's experimental method (appealing to human experience) to replace the specific moral sense with a pluralistic approach to morality based on a multitude of psychological motives. The Theory of Moral Sentiments begins with the following assertion:
- How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
- As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, we place ourselves in his situation.
| Table of contents |
|
2 See also 3 References |
This is an Article on The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Page Contains Information, Facts Details or Explanation Guide About The Theory of Moral Sentiments External links
See also
References
