Summa Theologica Guide, Meaning , Facts, Information and Description
The Summa Theologica (also widely known as the Summa Theologiae) is the most famous work of St. Thomas Aquinas. It was intended as a manual for beginners as a compilation of all of the main theological teachings of that time. It is not designed or ordered as an apologetic work, to convince non-Catholics, but it does contain a summary of the reasonings for almost all points of the Catholic faith. The Summa Theologica was considered an authoritative compilation of the dogma of the Catholic Church, thus formed the basis for the Inquisition to determine heresy, which deviated from it.The Summa Theologica is a more mature and structured version of an earlier work of St. Thomas, the Summa Contra Gentiles. This former work was more apologetic in nature, and each article was a refutation of a specific belief of different heresies and other religions.
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2 References within the Summa 3 Summary of notable points made by the Summa 4 External links 5 Text to integrate |
Structure
The Summa has a standard format for each article. At the top, a question is posed, such as "Whether it was fitting for Jesus to be poor." Then a series of objections are listed to try to prove the opposite. One objection for example could be "The Philosopher (Aristotle) says that the best life is being in the middle, between poor and rich." Then a short counter statement, which would take the exact opposite point of view, would come, such as "the bible says that God always does the right thing, but Jesus was God, and he was poor, so it must have been the right thing." Then the actual truth is presented, which is not usually one side or the other, but a clarification of the whole issue. This would be something like "although it's true that the best way of life is a middle ground between being poor and rich, the reason for this is that this allows a person to be not distracted from his goal by either want or luxury. But the goal of Jesus was to spread his message as far as possible, and so to be the most mobile, it was better to have nothing." Then individual counters to the first objections are made, if needed.
The greatest work of Thomas was the Summa
and it is the fullest presentation of his views. He
worked on it from the time of Clement IV. (after
1265) until the end of his life. When he died he had
reached question ninety of part iii., on the
subject of penance. What was lacking was afterward
added from the fourth book of his commentary on
the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard as a
supplementum, which is not found in
manuscripts of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries. The Summa was
translated into Greek (apparently by
Maximus Planudes, c. 1327), into
Armenian, into many European tongues,
and even into Chinese.
It consists of three parts. Part i. treats of God, who is the "first
cause, himself uncaused" (primum movens immobile)
and as such existent only in act (actu), that
is pure actuality without potentiality and, therefore,
without corporeality. His essence is actus purus
et perfectos. This follows from the fivefold proof
for the existence of God; namely, there must be a
first mover, unmoved, a first cause in the chain of
causes, an absolutely necessary being, an absolutely
perfect being, and a rational designer. In this
connection the thoughts of the unity, infinity,
unchangeableness, and goodness of the highest being are
deduced. The spiritual being of God is further
defined as thinking and willing. His knowledge is
absolutely perfect since he knows himself and all
things as appointed by him. Since every knowing
being strives after the thing known as end, will is
implied in knowing. Inasmuch as God knows
himself as the perfect good, he wills himself as end.
But in that everything is willed by God, everything
is brought by the divine will to himself in the
relation of means to end. Therein God wills good to
every being which exists, that is he loves it; and,
therefore, love is the fundamental relation of God
to the world. If the divine love be thought of
simply as act of will, it exists for every creature in
like measure: but if the good assured by love to
the individual be thought of, it exists for different
beings in various degrees. In so far as the loving
God gives to every being what it needs in relation
to the whole, he is just: in so far as he thereby does
away with misery, he is merciful. In every work
of God both justice and mercy are united and,
indeed, his justice always presupposes his mercy,
since he owes no one anything and gives more
bountifully than is due. As God rules in the world,
the "plan of the order of things" preexists in him;
i.e., his providence and the exercise of it in his
government are what condition as cause
everything which comes to pass in the world. Hence
follows predestination: from eternity some are
destined to eternal life, while as concerns others
"he permits some to fall short of that end."
Reprobation, however, is more than mere foreknowledge;
it is the "will of permitting anyone to fall into sin
and incur the penalty of condemnation for sin."
The effect of predestination is grace. Since God
is the first cause of everything, he is the cause of
even the free acts of men through predestination.
Determinism is deeply grounded in the system of
Thomas; things with their source of becoming in
God are ordered from eternity as means for the
realization of his end in himself. On moral grounds
Thomas advocates freedom energetically; but,
with his premises, he can have in mind only the
psychological form of self-motivation. Nothing
in the world is accidental or free, although it may
appear so in reference to the proximate cause. From
this point of view miracles become necessary in
themselves and are to be considered merely as
inexplicable to man. From the point of view
of the first cause all is unchangeable; although
from the limited point of view of the secondary cause
miracles may be spoken of. In his doctrine of the
Trinity Thomas starts from the Augustinian system.
Since God has only the functions of thinking and
willing, only two processiones can be asserted from
the Father. But these establish definite relations
of the persons of the Trinity one to another. The
relations must be conceived as real and not as
merely ideal; for, as with creatures relations arise
through certain accidents, since in God there is no
accident but all is substance, it follows that "the
relation really existing in God is the same as the
essence according to the thing. "From another
side, however, the relations as real must be really
distinguished one from another. Therefore, three
persons are to be affirmed in God. Man stands
opposite to God; he consists of soul and body. The
"intellectual soul" consists of intellect and will.
Furthermore the soul is the absolutely indivisible
form of man; it is immaterial substance, but not one
and the same in all men (as the Averrhoists
assumed). The soul's power of knowing has two sides;
a passive (the intellectus possibilis) and an active
(the intellectus agens). It is the capacity to form
concepts and to abstract the mind's images (species)
from the objects perceived by sense. But since
what the intellect abstracts from individual things
is a universal, the mind knows the universal
primarily and directly, and knows the singular
only indirectly by virtue of a certain reflexio
(cf. SCHOLASTICISM). As certain principles are
immanent in the mind for its speculative activity,
so also a "special disposition of works;" or the
synderesis (rudiment of conscience), is inborn in the
"practical reason," affording the idea of the moral
law of nature, so important in medieval ethics.
The first part of the Summa is summed up in the
thought that God governs the world as the
"universal first cause." God sways the intellect in that
he gives the power to know and impresses the
species intelligibiles on the mind, and he sways the
will in that he holds the good before
it as aim, and creates the virtus volendi.
"To will is nothing else than a certain
inclination toward the object of the
volition which is the universal good."
God works all in all; but so that things
also themselves exert their proper efficiency. Here
the Areopagitic ideas of the graduated effects of
created things play their part in Thomas's thought.
The second part of the Summa (two parts, prima
secundae and secundae seconda) follows this complex
of ideas. Its theme is man's striving, after the
highest end, which is the blessedness of the visio
beata. Here Thomas develops his system of ethics,
which has its root in Aristotle. In a chain of acts
of will man strives for the highest end. They are
free acts in so far as man has in himself the
knowledge of their end and therein the principle of action.
In that the will wills the end, it wills also the
appropriate means, chooses freely and completes the
consensus. Whether the act be good or evil depends
on the end. The "human reason" pronounces
judgment concerning the character of the end, it is,
therefore, the law for action. Human acts, however, are
meritorious in so far as they promote the
purpose of God and his honor. By repeating a good
action man acquires a moral habit or a quality
which enables him to do the good gladly and easily.
This is true, however, only of the intellectual and
moral virtues, which Thomas treats after the manner
of Aristotle; the theological virtues are imparted
by God to man as a "disposition," from which the
acts here proceed, but while they strengthen, they
do not form it. The "disposition" of evil is the
opposite alternative. An act becomes evil through
deviation from the reason and the divine moral law.
Therefore, sin involves two factors: its substance
or matter is lust; in form, however, it is deviation
from the divine law. Sin has its origin in the will,
which decides, against the reason, for a
"changeable good." Since, however, the will also moves
the other powers of man, sin has its seat in these
too. By choosing such a lower good as end, the
will is misled by self-love, so that this works as
cause in every sin. God is not the cause of sin,
since, on the contrary, he draws all things to
himself. But from another side God is the cause of all
things, so he is efficacious also in sin as actio but
not as ens. The devil is not directly the cause of
sin, but he incites by working on the imagination
and the sensuous impulse of man, as men or things
may also do. Sin is original. Adam's first sin
passes upon himself and all the succeeding race;
because he is the head of the human race and "by
virtue of procreation human nature is transmitted
and along with nature its infection." The powers
of generation are, therefore, designated
especially as "infected." The thought is involved
here by the fact that Thomas, like the other
scholastics, held to creationism, therefore taught
that the souls are created by God. Two things
according to Thomas constituted man's
righteousness in paradise-- the justitia originalis
or the harmony of all man's powers before they were blighted by
desire, and the possession of the gratis gratum
faciens (the continuous indwelling power of good).
Both are lost through original sin, which in form is
the "loss of original righteousness." The
consequence of this loss is the disorder and maiming of
man's nature, which shows itself in "ignorance;
malice, moral weakness, and especially in
concupiscentia, which is the material principle of
original sin." The course of thought here is as
follows: when the first man transgressed the order of
his nature appointed by nature and grace, he, and
with him the human race, lost this order. This
negative state is the essence of original sin. From
it follow an impairment and perversion of human
nature in which thenceforth lower aims rule
contrary to nature and release the lower element in
man. Since sin is contrary to the divine order, it is
guilt and subject to punishment. Guilt and
punishment correspond to each other; and since the
"apostasy from the invariable good which is
infinite," fulfilled by man, is unending, it merits
everlasting punishment.
But God works even in sinners to draw them to
the end by "instructing through the law and aiding
by grace." The law is the "precept of the practical
reason." As the moral law of nature, it is the
participation of the reason in the all-determining
"eternal reason." But since man falls short in his
appropriation of this law of reason, there is need of a
"divine law." And since the law applies to many
complicated relations, the practicae dispositiones of
the human law must be laid down. The divine law
consists of an old and a new. In so far as the old
divine law contains the moral law of nature it is
universally valid; what there is in it, however,
beyond this is valid only for the Jews. The new law
is "primarily grace itself " and so a "law given
within," "a gift superadded to nature by grace,"
but not a "written law." In this sense, as
sacramental grace, the new law justifies. It contains,
however, an "ordering" of external and internal
conduct, and so regarded is, as a matter of course,
identical with both the old law and the law of nature.
The consilia (see CONSILIA EVANGELICA) show how
one may attain the end "better and more
expediently" by full renunciation of worldly goods. Since
man is sinner and creature, he needs grace to reach
the final end. The "first cause" alone is able to
reclaim him to the "final end." This is true after
the fall, although it was needful before. Grace is,
on one side, "the free act of God," and, on the
other side, the effect of this act, the gratia infusa
or gratia creata, a habitus infusus which is instilled
into the "essence of the soul," "a certain gift of
disposition, something supernatural proceeding
from God into man." Grace is a supernatural
ethical character created in man by God, which
comprises in itself all good, both faith and love.
Justification by grace comprises four elements:
"the infusion of grace, the influencing of free will
toward God through faith, the influencing of free
will respecting sin, and the remission of sins." It
is a "transmutation of the human soul," and takes
place "instantaneously." A creative act of God
enters, which, however, executes itself as a spiritual
motive in a psychological form corresponding to the
nature of man. Semipelagian tendencies are far
removed from Thomas. In that man is created
anew he believes and loves, and now sin is forgiven.
Then begins good conduct; grace is the
"beginning of meritorious works." Thomas conceives
of merit in the Augustinian sense: God gives the
reward for that toward which he himself gives the
power. Man can never of himself deserve the prima
gratis, nor meritum de congruo (by natural ability;
cf. R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, ii.
105-106, Leipsic, 1898). After thus stating the principles
of morality, in the secunda secundae Thomas comes
to a minute exposition of his ethics according to the
scheme of the virtues. The conceptions of faith and
love are of much significance in the complete
system of Thomas. Man strives toward the highest
good with the will or through love. But since the
end must first be "apprehended in the intellect,"
knowledge of the end to be loved must precede love;
"because the will can not strive after God in perfect
love unless the intellect have true faith toward him."
Inasmuch as this truth which is to be known is
practical it first incites the will, which then brings
the reason to "assent." But since, furthermore,
the good in question is transcendent and
inaccessible to man by himself, it requires the infusion
of a supernatural "capacity " or "disposition" to
make man capable of faith as well as love.
Accordingly the object of both faith and love is God,
involving also the entire complex of truths and
commandments which God reveals, in so far as they
in fact relate to God and lead to him. Thus faith
becomes recognition of the teachings and precepts
of the Scriptures and the Church ("the first
subjection of man to God is by faith "). The object
of faith, however, is by its nature object of love;
therefore faith comes to completion only in love
("by love is the act of faith accomplished and
formed").
The doctrine of the sacraments follows the
Christology; the sacraments "have efficacy from the incarnate Word himself." They are not only signs of sanctification, but bring it about. It is inevitable that they bring spiritual gifts in sensuous form, because of the sensuous nature of man. The res sensibiles are the matter, the words of institution the form of the sacraments.
Contrary to the Franciscan view that the sacraments are mere symbols whose efficacy God accompanies with a directly
following creative act in the soul, Thomas holds it not
unfit to agree with Hugo of St. Victor that "a sacrament contains grace," or to teach that they "cause grace." Thomas attempts to remove the difficulty of a sensuous thing producing a creative effect, by distinguishing between the causa principalis et instrumentalis. God as the principal cause works through the sensuous thing as the means ordained by him for his end. "Just as instrumental power is acquired by the
instrument from this, that it is moved by the principal
agent, so also the sacrament obtains spiritual power
from the benediction of Christ and the application
of the minister to the use of the sacrament. There is
spiritual power in the sacraments in so far as they
have been ordained by God for a spiritual effect."
This spiritual power remains in the sensuous thing until it has attained its purpose. At the same time Thomas distinguished the gratia sacramentalis from the gratia virtutum et donorum, in that the former perfects the general essence and the powers of the soul, whilst the latter in particular brings to pass necessary spiritual effects for the Christian life. Later this distinction was ignored.
In a single statement, the effect of the sacraments is
to infuse justifying grace into men. What Christ effects is achieved through the sacraments. Christ's humanity was the instrument for the operation of his divinity; the sacraments are the instruments through which this operation of Christ's humanity passes over to men. Christ's humanity served his divinity as instrumentum conjunctum, like the hand: the sacraments are instrumenta separata,
like a staff; the former can use the latter, as the
hand can use a staff. For a more detailed exposition cf. Seeberg, ut sup., ii. 112 sqq. Of Thomas'
eschatology, according to the commentary on the
"Sentences," this is only a brief account. Everlasting blessedness consists in the vision of God: and this vision consists not in an abstraction or in a mental image supernaturally produced, but the divine substance itself is beheld, and in such manner that God himself becomes
immediately the form of the beholding, intellect; God is the object of the vision and at the same time causes the vision. The perfection of the blessed also demands that the body be restored to the soul as something to be made perfect by it. Since blessedness consists in operatio, it is made more perfect in that the soul has a definite operatio with the body, although the peculiar act of blessedness (i.e., the vision of God) has nothing to do with the body.
This is an Article on Summa Theologica. Page Contains Information, Facts Details or Explanation Guide About Summa Theologica References within the Summa
The Summa makes many references to certain thinkers which were held in great respect in St. Thomas's time. Almost the entire Summa is based on certain quotes from these authors, although many points made by them are refuted. Some were called by special names:Summary of notable points made by the Summa
External links
Text to integrate
This is from the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religion:4. The Summa, Part i.; Theology
5. The Summa, Part ii.; Ethics
6. The Summa, Part iii.; Christ
7. The Sacraments