Attack on Pearl Harbor Guide, Meaning , Facts, Information and Description
On the morning of December 7, 1941, planes and midget submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, carried out a surprise assault on the United States Navy base at Pearl Harbor, and against the Army Air Corps and Marine air fields nearby on Oahu, Hawaii Territory, now Hawaii. This attack has been called the Bombing of Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Pearl Harbor but, most commonly, the Attack on Pearl Harbor or simply Pearl Harbor.
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2 Strategy 3 Historical significance 4 Aftermath 5 Advance-knowledge debate 6 See also 7 Further reading 8 External links |
Overview
On November 26 1941 a fleet including six aircraft carriers commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo left Hitokappu Bay headed for Pearl Harbor under strict radio silence.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, that fleet's planes bombed all the US military air bases on the island (the biggest was the US Army air base at Hickam Field), and many of the ships anchored at Pearl, including "Battleship Row". Nearly every plane on the ground was destroyed; only a few fighters got airborne and offered any opposition. Twelve battleships and other ships either were sunk or damaged, 188 aircrafts were destroyed, 155 were damaged and 2,403 Americans lost their lives. The battleship USS Arizona exploded and sank with a loss of over 1,100 men, nearly half of the Americans dead. Its hull became, and remains, a memorial to those lost that day.
The first shots fired and the first casualties in the attack on Pearl Harbor actually occurred when USS Ward attacked and sank a Japanese midget submarine. There were five Ko-hyoteki class midget submarines which planned to torpedo US ships after the bombing started. None of the subs made it back safely, and only four out of the five have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard the five submarines, nine died and the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured; he became the first prisoner of war captured by the Americans in World War II.
Recent photographic analysis by the United States Naval Institute indicates a high likelihood that one midget submarine managed to enter the harbor, and successfully fired a torpedo into the USS West Virginia. The final disposition of this submarine is unknown. [1]
The Japanese aircraft carriers were: Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, Shokaku, Soryu, Zuikaku. Together they had a total of 441 planes, including fighters, torpedo-bombers, dive-bombers, and fighter-bombers. Of these, 29 were lost during the battle. The planes attacked in two waves, and Nagumo decided to forego a third attack in favor of withdrawing.
Strategy
presented an attractive concentration of targets.]]
The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, if only temporarily. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku himself suggested that even a successful attack would gain only a year or so of freedom of action. Japan had been embroiled in a war with China for some years (starting in 1931) and had seized Manchuria some years before. Planning began for a Pearl Harbor attack in support of further military advances in January 1941, and training for the mission was underway by mid-year when the project was finally judged worthwhile after some Imperial Navy infighting.
Part of the Japanese plans for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the US prior (and only just prior) to the attack. Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, including special representative Saburu Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the US reactions to the Japanese move into Indochina in the summer. Just before the attack, a long message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encyphered with the Purple machine), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull just before the attack was scheduled to begin (i.e., 1 PM Washington time). Because of decryption and typing delays, the Embassy personnel could not manage to do so; the long message breaking off negotiations was delivered well after the intended time, and well after the attack had actually begun. The late delivery of the note contributed to US outrage about the attack, and is a major reason for Roosevelt's famous characterization of that day as "... a date which will live in infamy". Yamamoto seems to have agreed; he was unhappy about the botched timing. He is commonly thought to have said, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve", but this seems to be a quote made for the movie, Tora! Tora! Tora. See Isoroku Yamamoto's sleeping giant quote for more information. Even though the quote may not have been said by Yamamoto, it did seem to capture his feelings about the attack.
Both parts of the final message had been decrypted by the US well before the Japanese Embassy had managed to finish, and it was the decrypt of the second part which prompted General George Marshall to send his famous warning to Hawaii that morning — the one that was actually delivered, by a young Japanese-American cycle messenger, to General Walter Short at Pearl Harbor several hours after the attack had ended (there had been difficulties with the Army's communications, and transmission delays by commercial cable, and it had somehow lost its "urgent" marking during its travels).
Background
The Japanese move into southern Indochina, beginning in mid-1941, provoked the major Powers in the area into action, more than the diplomatic protest notes which had been the usual for nearly a decade: the United States, with Britain and the Dutch colonial government, imposed an embargo on strategic materials, in particular oil and steel, to Japan in July. This threat to the Japanese economy (and to the military's supplies) was intended to force a reconsideration of the move into Indochina and perhaps even to the negotiating table. Roosevelt's decision to leave the Fleet in Pearl (closer to Japan than the US West coast, and so an increase in threat) is said to have been part of this response. Roosevelt regarded it as sufficiently important to relieve Admiral Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral Richardson, when he protested the decision. The US, and other Powers', reactions seem instead to have increased the Japanese military's commitment to a conquer and exploit approach against areas holding the resources endangered by the new embargo. With very limited oil production and minimal refined fuel reserves, Japan faced a real, and serious, problem. The Japanese leadership took the embargo as the stimulus to activate plans to seize supplies of strategic material in Asia, particularly southeast Asia. They could not expect the United States to remain passive when those plans were activated; it was this which had already led Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to consider ways to preemptively neutralize American power in the Pacific.
His idea of an attack on the naval base at Pearl Harbor was a tactic intended to help achieve this strategic goal. Japanese sources indicate that Yamamoto began to think about a possible strike at Pearl very early in 1941, and that, after some preliminary studies, had managed to get approval to start preliminary operational planning for it some months later. There was substantial opposition to any such operation within the Japanese Navy, and at one point Yamamoto threatened to resign if the operational planning were stopped. Permission to actually set up the operation was given in late summer at an Imperial Conference attended by the Emperor, and permission to actually stage the force into the Pacific in preparation for the attack was given at another Imperial Conference, also attended by the Emperor, in November. The November decision included recall of Nagumo's force only if the US agreed with essentially all of Japan's demands.
Immediate outcome
exploded after she was hit by a bomb dropped by Tadashi Kusumi.]]
In terms of its strategic objectives the attack on Pearl Harbor was, in the short to medium term, a spectacular success which eclipsed the wildest dreams of its planners and has few parallels in the military history of any era. Due to its grievous losses at Pearl Harbor and in the subsequent Japanese invasion of the Philippines, for the next six months, the United States Navy was unable to play any significant role in the Pacific War. With the US Pacific Fleet essentially out of the picture, Japan was free of worries about the other major Pacific naval power. It went on to conquer southeast Asia, the entire southwest Pacific and to extend its reach far into the Indian Ocean.
Longer-term effects
In the longer term, however, the Pearl Harbor attack was an unmitigated strategic disaster for Japan. Indeed Admiral Yamamoto, whose idea the Pearl Harbor attack was, had predicted that even a successful attack on the US Fleet would not and could not win a war with the US, as American productive capacity was too large. One of the main Japanese objectives was the three American aircraft carriers stationed in the Pacific, but these were not present - Enterprise was returning, Lexington had sortied a few days prior, and Saratoga was in San Diego following a refit at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Putting most of the US battleships out of commission, was widely regarded—in both Navies and by most observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for the Japanese. The elimination of the battleships left the US Navy with no choice but to put its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines, these being most of what was left—and these were the tools with which the US Navy halted and then reversed the Japanese advance. The loss of the battleships turned out to be less important than almost
everyone thought before (in Japan) and just after (in Japan and the US) the attack.
signed the Declaration of War against Japan on the day following the attack.]]Probably most significantly, the Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into action as little else could have done. Overnight, it united the US with the goal of fighting and winning the war with Japan, and it probably made possible the unconditional surrender position taken by the Allied Powers. Some historians believe that Japan was doomed to defeat by the attack on Pearl Harbor itself, regardless of whether the fuel depots and machine shops were destroyed or if the carriers had been in port and sunk.
US response
On December 8, 1941, the US Congress declared war on Japan with Jeannette Rankin being the only one dissenting vote. Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the declaration of war shortly afterward, calling the previous day "a date which will live in infamy." The US Government continued and intensified its military mobilization, and started to convert to a war economy.
A related question is why Nazi Germany declared war on the United States December 11, 1941 immediately following the Japanese attack. Hitler was under no obligation to do so under the terms of the Axis Pact, but did so anyhow. This doubly outraged the American public and allowed the United States to greatly step up its support of the United Kingdom, which delayed for some time a full US response to the setback in the Pacific.
Historical significance
This battle, like the Battle of Lexington and Concord, had history-altering consequences. It only had a small military impact due to the failure of the Japanese Navy to sink US aircraft carriers, but even if the air carriers had been sunk it would not have helped Japan in the long term. The attack firmly drew the United States and its massive industrial and service economy into World War II, leading to the defeat of the Axis powers worldwide. The Allied victory in this war and US emergence as a dominant world power has shaped international politics ever since.
In terms of military history, the attack on Pearl Harbor foreshadowed the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the center of naval power, replacing the battleship as the keystone of the fleet. However, it was not until later battles in the war, such as the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, that this breakthrough became apparent to the world's naval powers.
Aftermath
took a torpedo hit and capsized early in the battle. The wreck remains at Pearl Harbor.]]
Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only five ships were permanently lost to the Navy. These were the battleships USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, the old battleship USS Utah (then used as a target ship), and the destroyers USS Cassin and USS Downes; nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from the Arizona. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships USS California, USS West Virginia and USS Nevada. Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war.
There are many who say that the Japanese would have been wise to have attacked with a third strike to destroy the oil storage facilities, machine shops and dry docks at Pearl Harbor, including several senior officers on Nagumo's ships or flying in the strikes. Destruction of these facilities would have greatly increased the US Navy's difficulties as the nearest immediately usable Fleet facilities would have been several thousand miles east of Hawaii on the West Coast of the States. Nagumo declined to order a third strike for several reasons.
- losses during the second strike had been more significant than during the first, a third strike could have been expected to suffer still worse losses.
- the first two strikes had essentially used all the previously prepped aircraft available, so a third strike would have taken some time to prepare, allowing the Americans time to, perhaps, find and attack Nagumo's force. The location of the American carriers was and remained unknown to Nagumo.
- the Japanese pilots had not practiced attack against the Pearl Harbor shore facilities and organizing such an attack would have taken still more time, though several of the strike leaders urged a third strike anyway.
- the fuel situation did not permit remaining on station north of Pearl Harbor much longer. The Japanese were acting at the limit of their logistical ability to support the strike on Pearl Harbor. To remain in those waters for much longer would have risked running unacceptably low on fuel.
- the timing of a third strike would have been such that aircraft would probably have returned to their carriers after dark. Night operations from aircraft carriers were in their infancy in 1941, and neither the Japanese nor anyone else had developed reliable technique and doctrine.
- the second strike had essentially completed the entire mission, neutralization of the American Pacific Fleet.
- there was the simple danger of remaining near one place for too long. The Japanese were very fortunate to have escaped detection during their voyage from the Inland Sea to Hawaii. The longer they remained off Hawaii, the more danger they were in, e.g., from a lucky US Navy submarine, or from the absent American carriers.
- the carriers were needed to support the main Japanese attack, toward the "Southern Resources Area", where they were intending to capture oil and other supplies. The Japanese government had been reluctant to allow the attack at all as it took air cover from the southern thrust, and Nagumo was under strict orders not to risk his command any more than necessary. As the war games during the planning of the attack had predicted that 2-4 carriers might be lost in the attack Nagumo must have been very happy to suffer no losses, and didn't want to push his luck.
The attack has been depicted numerous times, not usually very accurately, on film. Examples include:
- From Here to Eternity (1953)
- Tora! Tora! Tora (1970)
- Pearl Harbor (2001)
In 1991, it was rumored that Japan was going to make an official apology to the United States for the attack. The apology did not come in the form many expected, however. The Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement that said Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the US at 1 P.M., twenty-five minutes before the attacks at Pearl Harbor were scheduled to begin. (It appears that the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message, which did not even formally break off negotiations, let alone declare war.) However, due to various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to make the declaration until well after the attacks had begun. For this, the Japanese government apologized. The Japanese records admitted into evidence during the Congressional Hearing show that the Japanese had not ever written a declaration of war until after they heard of the successful attack on Pearl Harbor. It would be difficult for them to deliver a document that had not yet been written. The two-line declaration of war was delivered to Ambassador Grew about ten hours after the attack was over. He was allowed to tranmit it to the United States where it was received late Monday afternoon.
The only US ship still afloat today that participated in the attack is the USCGC Taney.
It is usually viewed the the Japanese fell victim to victory disease due to the preceived ease of their first victory.
There has been considerable debate ever since December 8, 1941, as to how and why the United States had been caught unawares at Pearl Harbor, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. Some have argued that various parties (in some theories Roosevelt and/or other American officials, or Churchill and the British, in others all of the above, or additional players) knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen, or encouraged it, in order to force America into war.
This is an Article on Attack on Pearl Harbor. Page Contains Information, Facts Details or Explanation Guide About Attack on Pearl Harbor Advance-knowledge debate
Main article: Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debateSee also
Further reading
Further reading — reminiscences
External links